TOP SECRET/EXDIS

February 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR STATE SECRETARIAT

FROM: Richard M. Nixon

The outgoing cable to Warsaw regarding the US-Chicom talks has been approved by the President with the following changes:

(1) Page 2. Insert new numbered paragraph 3 following existing paragraph 2. Text of new numbered paragraph 3 reads as follows:

"3. President Nixon said, during his inaugural address:

"After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.

"We seek an open world -- open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

"Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition -- not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man."

(2) As a result of the above, all succeeding paragraphs are renumbered.

(3) Page 3. Delete last sentence on page beginning "It would, . . . " and concluding at top of page 4 with ". . . in Southeast Asia are concerned."

(4) Page 5. Delete sentence beginning fifth line from the bottom. "It is a limited presence for defensive purposes." Delete entire sentence.

(5) Page 5. Third line from the bottom, delete "in the Taiwan area."

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(6) Page 5. Second line from the bottom, after "only by pacific means," insert "this might permit us to move ahead to a joint declaration of peaceful co-existence with a clear understanding of the meaning of such a declaration." Delete remainder of sentence, "this would represent the creation of a new situation which we would then be prepared jointly to consider with you."

(7) Page 6. In new paragraph 12 delete "special American representative" and insert in its place, "representative of an American humanitarian group".

(8) Page 11. Paragraph G. third line from the bottom, change "paragraph 9" to read "paragraph 10".
February 12, 1969

TOP SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:       Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT:    U.S. Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting

The Secretary of State has sent you a recommended position and proposed instructions for the February 20 Warsaw meeting with the Chinese Communists. I have edited these instructions slightly to remove polemics and in one case to eliminate an implication that we might be prepared to remove our presence from Formosa. The instructions cover a number of continuing problems with Peking, such as the question of Americans held prisoner by the Communists and our desire for an understanding with Peking on assistance and return of astronauts. They also cover a broad range of contingencies that might arise during the Warsaw talks.

The principal issue facing us is the basic posture we should adopt at Warsaw. The attached memorandum (Tab A) discusses the four broad options open to us. As edited, the State Department instructions (Tab B) fall basically within the third option, namely to indicate our willingness to enter into serious negotiations with Peking, makes proposals on scientific exchanges, and invites specific proposals from the Chinese.

Right now, the third option has several advantages: (1) it would cause less concern to the Republic of China, presently very sensitive because Canada and Italy are moving to recognition of Peking; (2) it would reduce the risk that other countries might misinterpret any initiative on our part as marking a fundamental change in China policy in response to, or in connection with, Canadian recognition of Peking; and (3) it avoids prejudging U.S. China policy before the National Security Council undertakes its full dress review in late March.

Recommendation: That you approve the instructions at Tab B.

Approve Disapprove Amended
February 11, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Warsaw Talks

Background

On November 15, the U.S. proposed deferring the next Warsaw meeting until next February after being unable to obtain any answer from the Chinese Communists on their intentions with respect to the scheduled November 20 meeting. The Chinese responded on November 25, much more promptly than usual, with a letter and subsequent press release proposing the talks for February 20. In contrast to communications over recent years, the Chinese reply was less abusive and revived an old Chinese proposal for a joint declaration of adherence to the Bandung Conference five principles of "peaceful co-existence." This proposal was loosely linked to the usual Chinese Communist demand for U.S. military withdrawal from Taiwan. There have been other indications of a Chinese interest in returning to a "softer foreign policy" emphasizing state relations rather than being revolution-oriented. While there is no evidence Peking is seeking a détente with us, it is clear that Peking wishes to resume some form of dialogue with us at Warsaw.

Speculation as to possible Chinese Communist motivations focusses on five possibilities:

(a) Internal difficulties, which continue, may increase the desire for an easing of external relations;
(b) The continuing Paris peace talks coupled with the declining military fortunes of the North Vietnamese;

(c) As a reaction to increased Sino-Soviet tensions;

(d) As an effort to explore the views of the new Administration of President Nixon;

(e) As an effort to probe for softness in U.S. positions, particularly in our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

An additional factor to take into account is that there may be divided counsel in Peking on relations with the United States -- although there is no evidence of a fundamental shift of attitude towards the U.S. in the Warsaw talks proposals or in subsequent propaganda. At a minimum, we have a retreat from extremist positions taken during the height of the Great Cultural Revolution.

As a first step to test Chinese Communist intentions, we have proposed that the locus of the talks be shifted from a building provided by the Poles to either the U.S. or Chinese Embassy where Soviet/Polish eavesdropping will not be possible. Any serious talks with the Chinese are foreclosed by the present building. The Chinese have rejected this proposal but left the door open for discussion of it at the February 20 Warsaw meeting. In addition, we have been informed that the Chinese Communists will be represented by their Charge in Poland, in the continued absence of Ambassador Wang. (Almost all Chinese Ambassadors were called back to Peking many months ago for "re-education" during the height of the cultural revolution. They have not been returned.)

U.S. China Policy

In the past, the debate on China policy has focussed on the questions of recognition and UN representation, and U.S. tactics were built around proposals to expand contacts with the mainland. The debate on recognition and UN representation is essentially, in my view, a fruitless exercise given the opposition
of both Chinas to any two-China policy -- although we will constantly be faced with the problems in preventing an erosion of the Republic of China position. Similarly, efforts to expand contacts with the mainland have brought no response although they have the value of signalling our interest in a broader relationship with Peking. We have one more major play to make in this string -- the offer to resume non-strategic trade with the mainland.

The Warsaw talks offer an opportunity to shift the focus of our policy: to seeking a modus vivendi with the Communist Chinese which provides greater stability for East Asia, (a) without abandoning our commitment to Taiwan or undermining its position, or (b) damaging the interests of our Asian allies, principally Japan. More specifically, our policy would be directed towards seeking specific, self-enforceable arrangements with Peking which give some substance, and not lip service, to "peaceful co-existence".

Alternative U.S. Positions at Warsaw

At Warsaw, four broad options are open to us.

Option 1

At the one extreme, we could indicate that we are prepared to negotiate a normalization of relations with Peking based on an agreement for peaceful relations between the U.S. and Communist China and non-interference in the affairs of other countries. The proposal might be sweetened by an offer to resume non-strategic trade. The Chinese Communists would, however, be informed that our proposal is without prejudice to our relations with and commitment to the Republic of China. This approach, explicitly emphasizing normalization, would represent a basic change in U.S. policy -- although we have been implicitly moving in this direction.

Advantages

(1) A normalization of relations on this basis, accepted by Peking, would accomplish a shift in relations with the U.S.
from an ideological confrontation to state relations and a shift in Peking's policy away from political warfare directed against other Asian and less developed nations.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, would encourage elements within the Peking leadership who may be arguing that the U.S. is not a hostile force and that serious efforts should therefore be made to reach an understanding with it.

Disadvantages

(1) If not preceded by a probing of the mainland position, the Chinese Communists might interpret the proposal as "softness" on our part.

(2) The proposal, even if not accepted, could cause a crisis of confidence in Taiwan and seriously upset the Japanese Government which is trying to hold the line against both conservative and left-wing pressures for a more conciliatory policy towards Peking.

(3) The proposal is likely to lead Japan and other countries to try to get out in front of the U.S., with some countries quickly recognizing Communist China and others moving to change their position on UN representation.

To sum up: Given the low probability of an affirmative Peking response, this alternative involves considerable risks without prospect of immediate gains.

Option 2

The U.S. could indicate that we are prepared to enter into serious discussions or negotiations with respect to our policies with the exception of our commitment to Taiwan. This proposal might be combined with a specific offer or hint of our willingness to review our military presence in the Taiwan area if the Chinese renounce the use of force to settle this dispute.
Advantages

(1) This proposal would represent a move to greater flexibility on our part and a positive invitation to the Chinese Communists. It would also demonstrate that President Nixon’s Administration is prepared to take a more conciliatory approach to Peking in response to the shift in Peking’s line on the Warsaw talks as set forth in its November 25 note.

(2) It would likewise encourage whatever more conciliatory elements may exist within the Peking leadership.

(3) If this approach were not combined with an offer of strong military presence in Taiwan, it would provide time to consider U.S. China policy within the U.S. Government and to consult with other countries on specific steps to implement it.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is likely to leave Japan and other interested Asian countries jittery about a possible change in U.S. policy without elicitng an immediate positive response from Peking.

(2) It may not go far enough to force any serious reconsideration of policy in Peking.

(3) The specific offer on Taiwan would bring a quick and negative response from the Republic of China, already agitated by Canadian and Italian initiatives to recognize Peking. In addition it raises the issue of whether we are prepared to withdraw from our bases in Taiwan given the possibility of negotiations with respect to our Okinawan bases.

Option 3

We could pick up the Chinese reference to peaceful co-existence and ask whether they have any specific proposals to make. We would not, however, take any specific or generalized initiatives beyond indicating our willingness to hear out the Chinese.
Advantages

(1) This approach would emphasize our interest in developing a stable, peaceful environment in East Asia without committing us to any new actions at this time.

(2) It would cause the least concern with our allies of Asia and in fact would probably be welcome.

(3) It would permit a probe of Peking intentions and emphasize that the monkey is on its back for specific initiatives.

Disadvantages

(1) This approach is less likely to elicit a positive response from Peking, either immediately or in the longer term.

(2) It is likely to be construed by Peking and others as a holding action rather than a new initiative on our part.

Option 4

We could take the initiative and clobber the Chinese for past transgressions. This approach would signal a very tough stance and would probably close the door to any meaningful exchanges for some time -- assuming that there is any possibility under the present circumstances.
TOP SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Peking and Instructions for the February 20 Warsaw Meeting

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed instructions for the use of Ambassador Stoessel in his meeting with the Chinese Communist representative in Warsaw on February 20, 1969.

Approve ______  Disapprove ______

Discussion:

We have reviewed alternative approaches which might be made under the most discreet circumstances possible to the Chinese Communists at Warsaw on February 20. Bearing in mind tactical considerations and the potential impact that knowledge of these proposals would have on our Asian allies, on Moscow, on our UN policy, and on the attitudes of Western Europe and Latin America, we recommend that we adopt a firm posture on our commitments to the Republic of China coupled with a general expression of willingness to negotiate all other issues and work toward peaceful coexistence with Peking. This provides us an opportunity to stretch our present position and probe Peking's intentions without actually embarking on a major new course. We recommend as well that we vaguely hint at a connection between the U.S. military presence in the Taiwan Strait area and Peking's refusal to renounce the use of force in this area without explicitly indicating at this time what this connection might be. A "Discussion Paper" outlining the various pros and cons is enclosed.

William P. Rogers

TOP SECRET/EXDIS
JANUARY 7, 1969

THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION IN STATE INSTRUCTIONS TO STOESSEL WHICH CONSTITUTES A COMPOSITE OF STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO ASIAN LEADERS, AS WELL AS THOSE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT TO STOESSEL CONCERNING U.S.-CHICOM RELATIONS:

QUOTE: YOU SHOULD REITERATE THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY ROGERS DEALING WITH GREATER COMMUNICATION WITH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARE AUTHORITATIVE AND SERIOUS AND SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SUCH BY THE CHINESE. THE PRESIDENT UNDERLINED TO YOU PERSONALLY THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO A GREATER DIALOGUE WITH CHINA DURING YOUR VISIT WITH HIM HERE IN WASHINGTON. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHICOM REPRESENTATIVES, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE PRESIDENT AND U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT OF OTHER COUNTRIES THAN ABOUT THEIR DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. WHERE A COUNTRY WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US, WE WILL RECIPROCATE; ANYONE IS FREE TO PICK UP THAT OPTION AND WILL FIND US INTERESTED.

THE CHINESE ARE A MAJOR AND VITAL PEOPLE. FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE NO INTENTIONS OF TRYING TO ISOLATE CHINA. AT SOME POINT DOWN THE ROAD, ASIA WILL NEED TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER AND CHINA SHOULD BE INVOLVED.

THE U.S. DOES NOT WISH TO LIVE IN A WORLD OF INDEFINITE HOSTILITY. WE LOOK FORWARD FOR WAYS TO EXPAND CONTACTS WITH THE PEOPLE OF CHINA THROUGH EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND TRAVEL. THE U.S. HAS ALREADY MADE SOME GESTURES IN RELAXING CERTAIN TRADE AND TRAVEL REGULATIONS, TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR PURPOSE IS NOT TO STAND IN ISOLATION FROM CHINA.

THE U.S. DOES NOT PROPOSE TO TAKE SIDES IN SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES OR TO JOIN ANY CONDOMINIUM AGAINST CHINA NOR DO WE ACCEPT APPLICABILITY OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN ASIA. WE ARE TAKING STEPS TO LOOK INTO ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS PROVOCATIVE BY THE CHINESE AND WITH A VIEW TOWARD MAKING CHANGES TO REASSURE THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP.

WHILE REALIZING THAT MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES WILL REMAIN BETWEEN US, WE BELIEVE NEVERTHELESS THAT AN HONEST MUTUAL EFFORT TO EXPLORE STATE TO STATE DIFFERENCES, WITHOUT ENGAGING IN OLD IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS CAN BE OF BENEFIT TO BOTH SIDES. WE DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE WARSAW TALKS. WE WILL WELCOME CHINESE FLEXIBILITY AND WILL RESPOND TO IT. UNQUOTE.
FLASH - WIRE

FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

THRU: Lake

FROM: Haig/Holdridge

There follows rationale for inclusion in State instructions to Stoessel which constitutes a composite of statements made by the President to Asian leaders, as well as those made by the President to Stoessel concerning U.S.-Chicom relations.

QUOTE You should reiterate that statements made by President Nixon and Secretary Rogers dealing with greater communication with the Peoples Republic of China are authoritative and serious and should be taken as such by the Chinese. The President underlined to you personally the importance he attaches to a greater dialogue with China during your visit with him here in Washington. In your discussions with Chicom

The President and U.S. Government are more concerned about the international conduct of other countries than about their domestic political system. Where a country wants to improve relations with us, we will reciprocate; anyone is free to pick up that option and will find us interested.

The Chinese are a major and vital people. For this reason, we have no intentions of trying to isolate China. At some point down the road, Asia will need to move forward together and China should be involved.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT: State's Guidance for May 20 Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting

Secretary Rogers has sent a memorandum to the President enclosing for approval State's suggested guidance for Ambassador Stoessel's use at the May 20 Sino-US Ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw (Tab B). This guidance is essentially the same as that which was approved on April 6, but takes note of both the passage of time and the changed situation in Southeast Asia. It raises the question again as to whether and at what pace we should press for the higher-level meeting in Peking.

Secretary Rogers' cover memorandum discusses a number of alternative courses of action with respect to Southeast Asia and the higher-level meeting. On Southeast Asia, it notes that we could:

-- Discuss our objectives and hopes for a peaceful settlement, urge Chinese cooperation, but not link developments in the region to progress at the Warsaw Talks.

-- Separate Southeast Asia from the Warsaw Talks except for asking for an early and favorable response to the President's letter of April 7 to Chou En-lai on Laos and, as before, picking up the Chinese reference to reducing tensions in the Far East.

State favors the second course on the grounds that the Chinese response to an initiative from us on Southeast Asia would undoubtedly result in a polemical Chinese response and invite a return to the sterility of
the previous pattern of the talks. (It would be prepared to furnish separate contingency guidance, however, to deal with a Chinese propaganda attack on our actions in Indo-China.)

On the higher-level meeting, State's alternatives are to:

-- Proceed as originally planned to initiate discussions on the higher-level meeting.

-- Limit initial remarks to a request for confirmation that the Chinese still want a higher-level meeting, and discuss modalities only if we receive a favorable reply.

-- Hold back from our earlier interests in a higher-level meeting because of Southeast Asian developments.

State recommends the second of the above three courses on the grounds that a higher-level meeting would be useful now to show that our actions in Indo-China have not adversely affected the possibility of easing Sino-US tensions. We also would be proceeding from a position of strength which would minimize repercussions among our allies. At the same time, we would avoid the risk of an embarrassing Chinese rebuff if their attitude on the higher-level talks has changed.

I see no problem with State's recommendations. Due note is taken of events in Southeast Asia, but extended discussions are avoided which otherwise would almost certainly, as State suggests, result in a sterile polemic. On a higher-level meeting, the tactical argument appears sound - we would appear somewhat clumsy and would risk embarrassment if in Ambassador Stoeessel's opening presentation we were to push hard for such a meeting, and the Chinese then turned us down cold.

In the guidance itself, I have only two minor recommended changes: on page 10, paragraph 17, to eliminate the phrase "including the Taiwan area" so that our expressed interest in reducing Far Eastern tensions does not appear focussed only on Taiwan; and on page 12, paragraph 22, dropping the second sentence, which sets a time limit for the higher-level meeting.

I have drafted a memorandum from you to the President along the foregoing lines (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.